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REVIEW OF COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.*
Generals Mercier and Boisdeffre . . . made the fatal error
of standing on the principle that Army justice was, like the Army
itself, a thing apart, and that civilian conceptions of justice had no
weight before a military tribunal ...
From this it will be seen that in reality the question of Alfred
Dreyfus's guilt or innocence is minor to the far wider question of the
position of the Army in a democratic State. No Republican could
for a moment accept the claim that the principles of justice were
not identical, whatever the tribunal and whatever the procedure.'
I. THE NATURE AND PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM
On a night in March 1945, as the Third Reich was crumbling into
spectacular ruin, two buck privates from an American Tank Destroyer
Battalion were sent into the town of Langenlonsheim to look for a missing
comrade. In the town some fifty or sixty civilians had that night taken
shelter in a cellar from artillery fire. Three women among them were
raped by two men in American uniform. They made complaint, and the
next morning the two soldiers, Privates Arnold and Anthony, were arrested.
Their identification by the witnesses seems to have been a good deal less
than conclusive, 2 so much less so that the officer conducting the pretrial
investigation required by the seventieth Article of War 3 recommended that
the charges against the two be dropped. The Staff Judge Advocate being
of other opinion, the pair were tried jointly by general court-martial on
April 3. The appointed defense counsel was a medical officer, innocent of
previous experience of courts, martial or otherwise. The accused requested
a number of combat soldiers as witnesses, but the Army had advanced far
and fast in the interim, these combat soldiers had no fixed abode, and the
trial was held at a place about 100 miles east of Langenlonsheim. The up-
shot was that none of the witnesses requested by the accused was made
available. It is possible to infer that whatever search was made for them
was neither very thorough nor very persistent. Both Arnold and Anthony
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Chapman, The French Army and Politics, in SOLDIERS AND GOVERNMENTS 51,
62 (Howard ed. 1957). The word "Republican" is, of course, employed in the French
sense.
2. The facts of the case are set forth at some length in the opinion in Anthony v.
Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947). "Most" of the witnesses identified Arnold,
and "approximately half" identified Anthony; some were unable to identify either,
and some identified other soldiers in a lineup. The complaining witnesses who identi-
fied Anthony had originally described their assailant as having a mustache. Anthony
offered to produce witnesses to show that he had never worn a mustache, but in the
confusion incident to the headlong pursuit of the disintegrating Wehrmacht, none of
these witnesses was located by the military authorities.
3. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, § 1, 41 Stat. 802, as amended, 50 Stat. 724 (1937).
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COLLATERAL REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL
were found guilty and sentenced to death. The findings and sentences were
duly approved by the military reviewing authorities, although the sen-
tences were reduced first to life imprisonment and then to thirty-five years
confinement at hard labor-still a longish time to serve, even for a young
man. Anthony was sent to the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth,
Kansas, Arnold to the United States Correctional Reformatory at Seago-
ville, Texas-a happenstance that was to have major consequences.
In 1947, Anthony petitioned the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging in substance that
the court-martial was without jurisdiction because the mandatory pretrial
investigation was neither adequate nor impartial and because he had been
denied due process of law by a "totality of errors," including the incom-
petence, however excusable, of his appointed counsel, denial of counsel of
his own choice, failure to obtain the witnesses he had requested, and the
failure of the reviewing authority to set the conviction aside for insufficiency
of evidence. He produced the investigating officer, who had returned to
civilian life, and the latter's testimony convinced the court that the pre-
trial investigation had in fact fallen short of the requirements of Article
of War 70, which the court held to be jurisdictional. On this ground the
writ was granted, and Anthony went free.4 But Anthony's other conten-
tions were by no means rejected; although the judge chose to rest his hold-
ing on the defects in the pretrial investigation, he added that the inade-
quacies of the trial itself "individually and collectively might have justified
this court in plagiarizing some of the language used by Judge Biggs . . .
in Hicks v. Hiatt . . . -5 Since Hicks v. Hiatt6 was a case in which
Judge Biggs, a senior circuit judge sitting as a district judge, had granted
a writ of habeas corpus to a soldier convicted by general court-martial on
the stated ground that the accumulation of errors at the trial-notably in
the admission and exclusion of evidence-was so gross that the "procedures
of the military law were not applied to Hicks in a fundamentally fair way,"
'7
the reference to that decision made plain the sentiments of the Kansas dis-
4. Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947). The court left open the
question whether it thought that the failure to comply with Article of War 70 deprived
the court-martial of its jurisdiction because Congress had made such compliance a
condition precedent to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction or because the lack
of adequate and impartial investigation denied petitioner the due process "contemplated
by organic law," by which the court presumably meant the fifth amendment to the
Constitution. The result would, of course, be the same under either theory. Id. at 831;
see Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial, 12 U. Pivr. L. REv. 7, 17
(1950).
5. 71 F. Supp. at 831.
6. 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
7. Id. at 250. There was no appeal in the Hicks case because the proceedings had
been rendered moot by the military authorities' exercise of clemency. Id. at 250 n.28;
see Pasley, supra note 4, at 29. The Government's brief in the Anthony case described
Hicks v. Hiatt as "an unfortunate legal accident." See Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp.
823, 828 n.4 (D. Kan. 1947).
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
trict court. The Government did not appeal. The reasons for its acceptance
of the result are conjectural; but almost certainly those reasons did not
include agreement with the actual ground of the decision-the proposition
that failure to comply with Article of War 70 deprived the court-martial
of jurisdiction-for less than two years later the Government litigated that
issue to a successful conclusion in the Supreme Court.8 It may be guessed,
therefore, that the Army and the Department of Justice suspected that, on
the somewhat unappealing facts of the case, a Court of Appeals would be
tempted to affirm on the ground that the trial had been so unfair as to
amount to a denial of due process.
A few months later, Anthony's coaccused, Arnold, tried his luck in the
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, within whose jurisdic-
tion Seagoville is located. That court deemed the problem so simple and
the merits of the case so irrelevant-the entire opinion runs to fewer than
500 words-that it did not bother to state the grounds of Arnold's petition,
which it summarily denied.' 0 The bases, emotional and legal, of the Texas
district judge's holding cannot be better summarized than in his own words:
During this time that the alleged offense was committed and
the court-martial held, actual warfare was in progress. The Army
was on the forward move. Bullets were flying. Those who gathered
the witnesses, as well those who came and went, were in the firing
zone of attacking snipers, as well as the other dangers and eventuali-
ties of active warfare.
The court-martial was properly convened. It had jurisdiction
of the offense and of the parties. The sentence was within the law.
Those facts being irrefutably established, the civil court may not
inquire further. Hurse v. Caffey .... 11
So Arnold stayed in prison while Anthony went free.'
2
8. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949). Article 32 of the present Uniform
Code of Military Justice provides explicitly that a failure to comply with its require-
ment of thorough and impartial pretrial investigation shall not constitute "jurisdic-
tional error." 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1958).
9. From the facts that Arnold and Anthony had been tried in common, with the
same medical officer as defense counsel, that the same lawyer handled their petitions
for habeas corpus, and that the former investigating officer testified at Arnold's hear-
ing as he had at Anthony's, we are tolerably safe in inferring that the allegations
were about the same as in the earlier case.
10. Arnold v. Cozart, 75 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Tex. 1948). I do not know the sub-
sequent fate of Private Arnold. If, as may be conjectured, the reasons for the Gov-
ernment's failure to appeal in the case of Private Anthony lay in its doubts about the
merits of the case, Arnold may have received clemency. If he is still in jail, one can
hope that the monotony of his confinement is ameliorated by the receipt of an occa-
sional postcard from Private Anthony.
11. 75 F. Supp. at 48. The court's reasons for citing Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F. Supp.
363 (N.D. Tex. 1945) are not readily apparent. That case involved a collateral attack
upon a court-martial sentence by way of habeas corpus, but there the resemblance
ends. Hurse claimed no denial of constitutional due process, but only that the record
failed to show that the death penalty had, as required by the Articles of War, been
voted by all of the members of the court then present. The district court's holding
seems to have been merely that, pending measures by the military to correct the defect
in the record, the petition was premature.
12. This result is unfortunately not unique. Compare Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
[Vol. 61 : 40
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Whatever this was, it was not even-handed justice, for Arnold and
Anthony had had an equally fair or unfair trial.13 If one belonged behind
bars, so did the other; if one had a constitutional right to liberty, so had
the other. Nor do the results of the two cases reflect a mere difference in
two district judges' personal appraisals of the fairness of the particular
court-martial. What these two decisions do is to place in stark contrast
two basic approaches to the problem of collateral review of military jus-
tice-a problem which has bedeviled the lower federal courts since World
War II and one which the Supreme Court has so far conspicuously failed
to resolve. Although a number of cases postdating World War II have
raised the problem, in most of them the Court, or some faction of the Court,
has employed language which can be and has been quoted to support both
the position that the proper scope of the federal courts' review of military
justice is limited to a mechanical testing for the bare essentials of jurisdic-
tion over person and offense, and the power to impose the sentence-what
Justices Douglas and Black call "'jurisdiction' in the historic sense ' 14-
and the position that such review should approximate in breadth and depth
modern collateral review of the proceedings of civil courts in criminal cases,
including examination to see whether the ourt, though originally possess-
ing jurisdiction over the person and the offense, has lost it by unfairness
amounting to a denial of constitutional due process. The Supreme Court
cases, in fact, leave the reader with a strong impression that the Justices
have been, and probably still are, no more harmonious among themselves
than the lower federal judges and, indeed, that some of them have yet to
make up their own minds.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Prior to 1944 or thereabouts there was a nearly monolithic harmony
within and beneath the Supreme Court. Nothing was better settled than the
proposition that the federal courts, having no appellate jurisdiction over
military tribunals,15 would, in collateral proceedings attacking the validity
569 (1957), with De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1955). The Govern-
ment filed no petition for certiorari in the latter case, with the result that De Coster
went free while his coaccused stayed in jail.
13. There is some suggestion that the evidence against Arnold was stronger than
that against Anthony. See note 2 supra. But since it seems clear that the two were
together at the time they were alleged to have committed the offense, the identification
of one would necessarily at least place the other at the locus delicti. In any case, the
strength of the evidence was not-at least in theory and in the circumstances of these
cases-directly relevant to the question of the court-martial's jurisdiction.
14. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (dissenting opinion), rehearing denied,
346 U.S. 844 (1953).
15. E.g., It re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ; In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900);
Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 65, 81 (1858) ; Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; see
Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 697 (1881); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
50-54 (2d ed. 1920).
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
of a military sentence, most strictly limit themselves to "ascertaining whether
the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, and
whether . . . it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced."10
"[N]o mere errors in their proceedings are open to consideration. The
single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.' 17 Nor were these rescripts merely
sweeping language gratuitously employed in the decision of easy cases. Con-
sider, for example, Keyes v. United States,18 a suit by a cashiered second
lieutenant in the 5th Cavalry to collect his pay, on the ground that the
court-martial sentence dismissing him from the service was invalid. The
"mere errors" in that case, as found by the Court of Claims, included the
facts that the colonel commanding the regiment had preferred one of the
charges, had appeared as a prosecution witness, and, sitting as a member
of the court-martial, had voted on the finding and sentence. The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of Keyes's petition on the uncomplicated ground
that, since "the court-martial ...had cognizance of the charges made, and
had jurisdiction of the person of the appellant . . . .whatever irregularities
or errors are alleged to have occurred in the proceedings, the sentence of
dismissal must be held valid when it is questioned in this collateral way."'"
Even ex-Captain Oberlin Carter, probably as pertinacious a long-distance
litigant as is to be found in the legal annals of the United States, could find
no chink or cranny in the wall, though he devoted nearly forty years of
indefatigable and almost monomaniac effort to attempts to secure the nul-
lification of his court-martial sentence, and ended by alleging nothing less
than personal prejudice on the part of the Assistant Judge Advocate Gen-
eral and the members of the court-martial, intimidation of defense wit-
nesses, abstraction of defense documentary evidence, use by the prosecution
of evidence known by it to be false, and sundry other irregularities which,
if they really occurred (and no court ever decided that they did not), would
certainly seem to have given the proceedings some tincture of unfairness.
He never won a round.
20
16. Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900). This language was quoted with
approval in Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 380 (1902), in which Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Fuller eulogized the proposition as "the salutary rule that the sentences of courts
martial, when affirmed by the military tribunal of last resort, cannot be revised by the
civil courts save only when void because of an absolute want of power, and not merely
voidable because of the defective exercise of power possessed." Id. at 401.
17. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) ; see Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416
(1922); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 52-53 (2d ed. 1920). These
talismanic sentences are cited with particular frequency in subsequent cases. The Manual
for Courts-Martial, which favors the orthodox view, quotes them. See MANUAL FOR
COURTs-MARTIAL UN=ITE STATES f[ 214C (1951).
18. 109 U.S. 336 (1883).
19. Id. at 340. Such language still finds echoes in modern courts. See Moses v.
United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 374, 380 (1957) ("It is well settled that this court, regard-
less of any errors that may have been committed, cannot grant relief from the con-
sequences of a court-martial sentence if the court-martial had jurisdiction of the case.").
20. In re Carter, 97 Fed. 496 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd stb norn. Rose ex rel. Carter
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The Second World War saw armies of a size unprecedented in the
history of the United States and, as a necessary corollary, courts-martial in
numbers theretofore unimaginable. Despite large scale post-war clemency,21
there remained in federal penal institutions a great number of men who
were there pursuant to sentences of Army or Navy courts-martial. 22 Being
no more anxious to stay in jail than their civilian counterparts, they presently
took to the courts by squads and platoons. Few of the petitioners could
adduce the orthodox grounds of collateral attack, for in practically every
case it was plain that the court-martial had had jurisdiction over the per-
son and the offense and power to impose the sentence; but it was inevitable,
given the frequently amateur personnel of wartime courts-martial and the
stresses and strains under which they operated, especially overseas, that
some of the petitioners could tell startling, and sometimes apparently
truthful, tales of unfairness, calculated to cause a federal judge of average
fairmindedness to chafe under the restrictions of the traditional rules and
make him receptive to the heterodox proposition that even soldiers were
entitled to some sort of due process, whether by virtue of the Constitution or
the Articles of War, the denial of which could cause a court-martial to lose
the jurisdiction that it would otherwise have had. Mention has been made
of the Hicks case; another circuit judge siting as a district judge detonated
with an explosion still more ear-shattering. Starting with the mild observa-
tion that "the trial ... in the eyes of both the prosecution and the defense
was wholly obnoxious and repulsive to their fundamental sense of justice,"
Judge Murrah had "no difficulty in finding that the court which tried this
man was saturated with tyranny; the compliance with the Articles of War
and with military justice was an empty and farcical compliance only ... ,,23
The petitioner went free, at least temporarily.24 There were a number of
v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 176 U.S. 684, appeal dismissed, 177
U.S. 496 (1900); Carter v. McClaughry, 105 Fed. 614 (C.C.D. Kan. 1900), aff'd,
183 U.S. 365 (1902); Carter v. Woodring, 92 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 752 (1937); see Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 846 (1953) (separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
21. It was estimated that the Clemency Board established by the War Department
after World War II would examine about 30,000 cases out of a total of 90,000 war-
time convictions by general courts-martial of the Army, the remainder of those con-
victed being restored to duty through the Army's rehabilitation program. See Note, 57
YALE L.J. 483, 488 & n.39 (1948).
22. As of the end of 1945, this prison population numbered nearly 40,000, more
than a thirty-fold increase since 1940. See U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, PRISONERS
IN STATE AND FEDERAL PuSONS AND REFORmATORmS 103 (1946).
23. Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825, 826 (D. Kan. 1948). The opinion was ob-
viously delivered on the spot, orally, and at white heat.
24. The subsequent history of the Beets case was somewhat anticlimactic. After the
writ had been granted and before the appeal was heard, Congress amended the 53d
Article of War to permit application to the Judge Advocate General for vacation of
sentence or new trial. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 230, 62 Stat. 639. The
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that Beets was required to exhaust his newly
granted administrative remedy before seeking collateral review. Hunter v. Beets, 180
F.2d 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950). Again, I do not know the
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other cases in which inferior federal courts undertook to conduct a search-
ing collateral review of allegedly unfair proceedings of courts-martial, 25
though in all probability none of them got up quite as great a head of steam
as Judge Murrah.26
Despite these mutterings, and even roars, of discontent among the
judicial proletariat, the Supreme Court was far from ready to open the
safety valve; indeed, it has not to this day allowed a military prisoner
to be freed because of unfairness in his trial. In Humphrey v. Smlth,V
the petitioner sought to impeach a court-martial verdict not only on the
ground (as in the Anthony case) that inadequate pretrial investigation de-
prived the court-martial of jurisdiction, but on the further ground that the
incompetence of his counsel and errors in the admission of evidence had
had that effect. The District Court, although disclaiming any intent to exam-
ine the record for error, did in fact review it carefully and found no merit
in any of the contentions.28 Basing its decision solely on the inadequacy
of the pretrial investigation, the Court of Appeals ordered the writ granted.20
Mr. Justice Black and five of his brethren, reversing on the ground that
the requirement of pretrial investigation was not jurisdictional, nevertheless
went out of their way "at once [to] dispose of" petitioner's other con-
tentions,30 citing those most orthodox of orthodox decisions, Carter v.
McClaughry and In re Yanshita. Yet a close observer might have dis-
cerned that the door was not quite closed, for Mr. Justice Black, perhaps
casually and perhaps with meticulous care, limited the holding to a "court-
martial conviction resulting from a trial fairly conducted"3 1-a qualification
which, however cautious, had not been adumbrated by anything in the
language of earlier opinions. Moreover, although Smith's contentions went
not only to the alleged absence of evidence sufficient to support his con-
viction but also to the alleged unfairness of his trial, all that Mr. Justice
Black actually said was that, while the evidence "was in sharp dispute, . . .
our authority in habeas corpus proceedings to review court-martial judg-
ultimate fate of the petitioner; his name appears no more in the reports, from which
it may perhaps be inferred that the administrative remedy was effective.
25. E.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 103 (1950);
U.S. ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944) ; see Kuykendall v. Hunter,
187 F.2d 545, 546 (10th Cir. 1951). For an excellent analysis and evaluation of the cases
decided prior to 1950 see Pasley, supra note 4. See also Note, Collateral Attack on Courts-
Martial in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 483 (1948).
26. Compare, however, Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207 (Ct. Cl. 1947)
("flagrant case of military despotism. . . . verdict . . . evidently rendered in spite
against a junior officer who had dared to demonstrate the fallibility of the judgment
of his superior officers .... almost complete denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights").
27. 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
28. See Ex parte Smith, 72 F. Supp. 935, 937 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
29. Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948).
30. 336 U.S. at 696. The three dissenting Justices, Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge,
confined their dissent to the pretrial investigation question. Id. at 701.
31. Id. at 701.
[Vol. 61 : 40
HeinOnline -- 61 Colum. L. Rev. 46 1961
46 I . :
-
l l t - artial,2G




f fair ess in his trial. In Humphrey v. Smith,21
t titi t t i t ti l 011
i t t ti l j i i ti ,
t l
t t ff t. i tri t rt, lt i l i i i t t t .,...m
it
i t t ti .28 i
i l i ti , 20
t
t i l i l,
,so ter
l ghry amas .
t t t t it l , . ti l ,
t-
ducted"31-a
i , ti , t
' t
t l t t ll t
.
i s
lti t f t f t titi r; i i t t ,
it r s i f rr t t t i istr ti r ff ti .
25. .g., iatt v. r , 175 . 273 ( t ir. ), rev' , . . 103 ( 950);
. . e% I. I . i tt, . , ( ir. ) ; Il . t r,
. , ( t ir. ). r a e ceIIe t a al sis a e al ati f t e cases
i ri r t l , t . l t , ll teral tt Ol~ ts-
rtial ill t eral rts, . . ( ).
26. o pare, ho ever, Shapiro v. nited tates, 69 . upp. 205, 207 ( t. l. 1947)
( fl r t f ilit r ti • . i t .• i tl
i t j i r i t t t t lli ilit t j t
• t ' ti l ").
. . . ( 49).
% te . . 7).
. it . i tt, . i . ).
. . . t . t i ti ti , , l , tl ,
fi t ir iss t t t r tri l i sti ti ti . l . t .
. l . t .
1961] COLLATERAL REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL 47
ments does not permit us to pass on the guilt or innocence of persons
convicted by courts-martial" 3 ---a proposition which, assuming-the presence
of some evidence to support the finding, is unlikely to be disputed by many
lawyers, military or civilian. Finally, perusal of the district court's review
,of the record leaves one pretty well persuaded that Smith was guilty, a
circumstance which in practice may not be altogether irrelevant; none of the
Justices could have lost much sleep over the hardness of his case. Thus
the Smith case afforded no reliable basis for prophecy about what would
happen if a really hard case reached the Court. In a case decided the same
day the Court refused to exclude the possibility that at least the double
jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was applicable to court-martial
proceedings, though it found that the petitioner had not in fact been put
twice in jeopardy within the intent of that amendment.
33
What seemed to a district court and a court of appeals a sufficiently
hard case did in fact reach the Court the following year-a case in which
the lower courts had directed the petitioner's release because the record was
so "replete with highly prejudicial errors and irregularities" as to amount
to a denial of due process in violation of the fifth amendment.24 The Supreme
Court unanimously35 reversed and did so in terms calculated sharply to
remind the errant lower courts of their limited function in military habeas
corpus proceedings:
We think the court was in error in extending its review, for
the purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause,
to such matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff
judge advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial investigation,
and the competence of the law member and defense counsel ....
"The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." In re Grimley . ..
the correction of any errors [the court-martial) may have committed
is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review
its decision.3 6
Nevertheless, it would strain an ordinarily conscientious court to ignore
such errors as were found by the court of appeals in the Brown case; those
errors included conviction of murder on "evidence that does not measure
to malice, premeditation, or deliberation," incompetence and lack of prepara-
tion of appointed defense counsel, "gross" incompetence of the court's law
member, and "total misconception of the applicable law" by the military
32. Id. at 696.
33. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). Again Mr. Justice Black wrote for the
majority. The three dissenters, who thought Wade was put twice in jeopardy, stated
flatly, as they had to, that Wade, though a soldier, had rights under the fifth amend-
ment the denial of which was a proper subject of collateral review. Id. at 692, 694. See
text accompanying notes 74, 77 infra.
34. Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1949), reV'd, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
35. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate.
36. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110 (1950).
HeinOnline -- 61 Colum. L. Rev. 47 1961
L I L
it
'Convict ts- artial"32 't e
t l
l , ilit i ili . i ll , l t i t i t t' i
of t l tt ll t t it ilt ,
i t i i ti t lt t i l t; t




j it i the intent of that a end ent.33
t tl
i i l ti s" t
.34





t tt t iti l t t i t t ff
'
res e t's c icti , t f t r tri l i sti ti ,






i l i ti ce t
, ti ,"
ti i t l, i t t t' l
, ti l
. l . .
. ).
j it . t i t , t t t t i i j , t t
fl tl , t t , t t , t l i r, ri t r t fift -
e t t e e ial f ic as a r er s ject f c llateral re ie . l . t , . ee
i t , i fra.
. i tt . r , . , ( t ir. ), mId, . . ( 50).
t .
. i tt . , . . , 50).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
reviewing authorities.37 Had the proceedings been concerned with a con-
viction by a civil court, such findings would certainly have presented a
substantial question of denial of due process.
3 8
If the Brown case was a longish step to the rear, the Court later in
the same term took a half pace forward. In Whelchel v. McDonald,0 a
case in which the petitioner in substance contended that he had been denied
due process by the military reviewing authorities' rejection of his claim of
insanity, Mr. Justice Douglas duly recited the conventional propositions that
the only issue was "jurisdiction" and that the military's errors in evaluating
the evidence of insanity would not go to jurisdiction; but he added that
the accused was entitled to an opportunity to present the defense of in-
sanity and that a denial of that opportunity would have gone to jurisdiction.
The petitioner had had that opportunity. There is nothing in the opinion
to suggest that the result would have been different if the court-martial
had found him mentally responsible after hearing a panel of seven psychiatrists
unanimously testify that Whelchel was a hopeless lunatic; the error would
have been only an error in evaluating the evidence. It has been said that
Whelchel expanded the concept of "jurisdiction" in habeas corpus review
of courts-martial, 40 but the expansion is measurable with a micrometer.
III. ANALOGUES IN CIVIL COURTS
It is appropriate here to digress slightly to recall the history of the
problem in its civilian form. It should not be forgotten that until shortly
before World War II the scope of collateral review of civilian criminal
proceedings was not appreciably greater; it too was said to go only to
"jurisdiction" in the narrowest or "historic" sense. 41 Historically, in fact,
court-martial verdicts were more vulnerable to habeas corpus than were
those of the civil courts: "at common law a judgment of conviction rendered
by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was conclusive proof that con-
finement was legal,"4 2 while "a court martial was considered as one of those
inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, whose judgment may be questioned
collaterally, '43 and from the earliest times a civil court could properly in-
37. 175 F.2d at 277.
38. Compare, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S.
134 (1951); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938) ; United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959).
39. 340 U.S. 122 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 923 (1951).
40. See Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952), ree'd sub norn. Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
41. Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 211 (1911) ; see separate opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 845-46 (1953). But cf. Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
42. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1952).
43. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 209 (1830).
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spect at least the military' court's jurisdiction over the person and offense
and the lawfulness of its sentence.44 Thus, President Lincoln's suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus was intended and operated for the benefit
of the various types of military tribunal which proliferated during the
Civil War-indeed, the original suspension of April 27, 1861, took the
form of an executive order delegating to the Commanding General of the
United States Army and other military officers authority to suspend the
writ. 4r Not until 1867 did Congress cast the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of the federal courts in substantially its present form by extending the
writ to all cases in which "any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." 40
It is noteworthy that neither that statute nor any amendment dif-
ferentiates between civil and military tribunals.47 It is true that Article 76
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice4 8 provides that
the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as ap-
proved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this code . . . shall be
final and conclusive, and orders publishing the proceedings of courts-
martial and all action taken pursuant to such proceedings shall be
binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the
United States, subject only to action upon a petition for a new
trial as provided in article 73 and to action by the Secretary of a
Department as provided in article 74, and the authority of the
President.
But the Supreme Court refused to read the immediate predecessor of that
article, which was worded no less categorically, as intended to deprive the
civil courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction,49 and it is clear that Article 76
has no greater effect, as is demonstrated by the numerous cases subsequent
44. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330, 337 (1806); Ex parte Reed, 100
U.S. 13 (1879) ; see Ex parte Watkins, supra note 43, at 208-09.
45. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.10 (1942) ; Schaffter & Mathews, The
Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of The United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 443, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1956); cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Mudd, 17 Fed. Cas. 954 (No. 9899) (D.C.S.C.
Fla. 1868). The report describes the Mudd case as "nowhere reported; opinion not now
accessible," but summarizes it as holding that, "The crime of murdering the president
of the United States, in time of civil war is triable by a military commission." Dr. Mudd
was the luckless surgeon who set the broken leg of John Wilkes Booth and paid for
this Samaritan act by many years of imprisonment in a peculiarly dismal jail.
46. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1952); H-ART & WEcHSLER, TE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEmAL SYsTEam 1236-37 '(1953).
47. The present statute provides in pertinent part that "the writ of habeas corpus
shall not extend to a prisoner unless-(l) He is in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
.... (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1958).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1958).
49. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132 (1950); see Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 142 (1953).
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to its enactment in which the Court has sanctioned the granting of the writ
to persons convicted by court-martial. 50
But, although historically the scope of collateral review of civilian
criminal proceedings was not greater than that of courts-martial, a gradual
development, inaugurated by the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 1 has given
new dimensions to the concept of examination in collateral proceedings of
the "jurisdiction" of a civilian criminal court. The technical rationale is
that jurisdiction, though it existed when the trial began, evaporated because
the defendant was somehow denied constitutional due process. 2 This latter
is itself an uncertain but expanding concept which includes at least such
basic unfairness as lack of counsel,53 or the admission of a coerced confes-
sion, 5 4 or the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony 5 5-all of
which are as likely to occur in a court-martial as in a civilian criminal pro-
ceeding. Although even in civil cases old views die hard in some lower fed-
eral courts,56 it is clear today that if a district court is satisfied that a state
prisoner was in fact denied the effective assistance of counsel or that a
coerced confession was in fact admitted in evidence against him, it will
grant the writ regardless of what the state court may have found on those
issues. 57  Whether it is desirable to employ this particular method of
vindicating the state prisoner's federal constitutional rights is not the im-
mediate question. 58 For the present at least, that controversy has been
50. E.g., McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960);
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) ; Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955). These were all decided on the ground that a court-martial could not con-
stitutionally exercise jurisdiction over sundry types of civilians and involved no question
of loss of jurisdiction by unfairness amounting to a denial of due process.
At least one recent decision of a lower federal court included article 76 among its
reasons for abstaining from collateral review of a military verdict. See Alley v. Chief,
Finance Center, U.S. Army, 167 F. Supp. 303, 304 (S.D. Ind. 1958). The Government
apparently takes the position that article 76 is at least a bar to a collateral attack by
proceedings other than a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Begalke v. United
States, No. 159-55, Ct. Cl., Jan. 20, 1960, cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 108 (1960). See
text accompanying notes 99-103 infra.
51. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
52. See Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral
Attack on The Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 52 (1956) ; Note, The Freedom Writ-
The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HAuv. L. REv. 657 (1948).
53. E.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
54. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
55. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
56. Cf. Wooten v. Bomar, 267 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1959). See also Reitz, Federal
Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461,
462 (1960).
57. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
58. The problem of the proper extent of federal intervention in this area-whether
for example, it ought to be limited to the Supreme Court's review, usually on certiorari,
of the judgments of state courts, and whether the Supreme Court ought to think
quite so expansively when defining due process-has naturally provoked an exceedingly
hot controversy and a correspondingly voluminous literature, judicial and otherwise,
most of it highly polemical. See, e.g., Report of the Cminittee on Habeas Corpus of
the Conference of Chief Justices (1954), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1293, 85th Cong.,
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resolved in favor of the proposition that the federal courts may examine
for themselves the fairness of a petitioner's trial in a state court and may
range far beyond the record in the course of that examination. The not less
important question with which we are here concerned and which the Supreme
Court will sooner or later have to decide, is whether there is any good
reason why military tribunals should not be subject to the same quality
of constitutional policing as is applied to the criminal proceedings of the
courts of the states---emphasizing, however, that procedures which would in-
validate a civilian trial may be justified by military exigency. The process
which is due a soldier is not necessarily the same as that due a civilian.
IV. Burns v. Wilson: THaE SUPREME COURT'S MosT RECENT VIEW
Three years after Whelchel v. McDonald the Supreme Court decided
Burns v. Wilson,5" which after seven years still stands as the principal light-
house in these trackless waters, however low its candlepower. On its facts
it presented precisely the question posed in the preceding paragraph-
whether and to what extent the principle of Johnson v. Zerbst ought to be
applied to collateral review of court-martial verdicts. Burns and another
soldier had been convicted by general court-martial of rape and murder
and sentenced to death. Having exhausted the procedures of military re-
view, they petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court for
the District of Columbia.6" Burns and his copetitioner made a number of
2d Sess. 7 (1958); concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 532 (1953) ; Pollak, supra note 52; Reitz, supra note 56.
59. 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
60. Burns and his copetitioner had a troublesome preliminary problem, for they
were confined in Japan and thus several thousand miles beyond the territorial juris-
diction of any district court of the United States. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)
(1958), which permits federal courts to grant the writ "within their respective juris-
dictions," has been construed by the Supreme Court to require a petitioner to file in
the court for the district in which he is confined. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1948); see Whiting v. Chew, 273 F.2d 885, 886 (4th Cir. 1960). But the opinion in
Ahrens v. Clark, supra, explicitly left open "the question of what process, if any, a
person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may
employ to assert federal rights," id. at 192 n.4; see 'Comment, 49 MicE. L. REv. 870
(1951), and the Supreme Court has yet to dispose of that question. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held in Eisentrager v. Forrestal,
174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.), revd on other groumds sub noin. Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1949), that one confined in Germany could petition in the district where
his custodian, or a person having authority over that custodian, such as the Secretary
of Defense, was located, has stuck to that position, at least in cases in which the peti-
tioner was an American citizen. Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Cozart v.
Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 352 U.S. 884 (1956).
The Government's policy on the matter is very far from clear. In U.S. ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), in which the petitioner had been apprehended in
Pittsburgh and promptly flown to Korea to be court-martialed, the Government con-
ceded the district court's jurisdiction to entertain the petition, but did so on the tor-
tuous reasoning that since Toth might have sought the writ at any time after his
apprehension and before his removal from the United States, he was to be distinguished
from "a person [who] has never had a cause of action which was clearly within the
jurisdiction of a district court of the United States, as, for example, an American
citizen apprehended outside the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States
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allegations, supported by possibly truthful affidavits and other evidence out-
side the record, which raised in the mind of one circuit judge such "serious
doubt whether 'the whole course of events' from apprehension to convic-
tion did not amount to a serious denial of fundamental fairness" that he
wanted the case remanded for a hearing on the merits.01 The petitioners
alleged that they had been illegally detained; that their confessions had
been coerced; that they had been denied the effective assistance of counsel;
that favorable evidence had been suppressed and perjured testimony know-
ingly used; and that the trial was conducted in an atmosphere of "hysteria
and terror. '6 2 The district court summarily dismissed the petitions on the
traditional grounds. The court of appeals, though it examined the record
in detail, affirmed---essentially on the ground that these issues of fact had
been presented to and fully explored and resolved by the military authorities
upon "substantial evidence."
In the Supreme Court four different opinions were filed; none was
supported by a majority of the Court. In what many lower courts seem
to have mistaken for a majority opinion, the largest faction, consisting of
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Clark, Burton and Reed, voted to
affirm, stating that:
1. "The constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough,
and sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers-as well as civilians-from the
crude injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt
by dispensing with rudimentary fairness ...."03
2. "But in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters
open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil cases." 04 If the
by authority of the United States," Brief for the Respondent, p. 53 n. 29, U.S. ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, supra; see 350 U.S. at 25 (Reed, J., dissenting). Since Toth was
arrested in Pittsburgh on May 13, flown to Maryland on the same day, to California
on May 15, and to Korea on the day after, he would have had to display both presence
of mind and rapid legal footwork to file a petition in a district in which he was con-
fined. In a subsequent case in which the petitioning soldier had been apprehended, and
was at the time he filed, confined outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the
Government argued, though unsuccessfully, that the district court was without juris-
diction. Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Since on remand the petition
was found to be without merit, no review of the question of territorial jurisdiction
could be sought. Day v. Wilson, 155 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1957). The most that can
be said is that the Government stops short of the position that it can frustrate the
writ by the simple expedient of spiriting a prisoner out of the country. The problem,
however intriguing, is probably not of major practical importance in time of peace,
because soldiers who are sentenced to death or terms of imprisonment sufficiently long
to afford time for the filing and hearing of a petition will normally be returned to the
United States for execution or confinement. In the Bums case a majority of the Court,
and apparently the parties as well, simply ignored the question, though Mr. Justice
Frankfurter vigorously advocated its confrontation and decision. 346 U.S. at 851-52
(dissenting opinion).
61. See Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 348, 352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), aff'd sub nor. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
62. See Burns v. Lovett, mspra note 61, at 343-46.
63. 346 U.S. at 142.
64. Id. at 139.
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Uniform Code's provision that the determination of military tribunals shall
be final and binding on all courts does not altogether preclude habeas corpus
jurisdiction, yet "these provisions do mean that when a military decision has
dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not
open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the
evidence."05
3. Thus, in the instant case, "had the military courts manifestly re-
fused to consider" the petitioners' allegations of fundamental unfairness, the
district court might have evaluated for itself the question of due process.
But, since the record showed that the military courts "have heard petitioners
out" on these matters, nothing remained for the civil courts to do.66
Justices Jackson and Minton concurred in the result.6 7 The former
wrote no opinion, and the latter registered his pronounced and explicit dis-
approval of the idea that "the federal courts sit to protect the constitutional
rights of military defendants," beyond satisfying themselves of the exist-
ence of jurisdiction in the traditional sense; he attested his orthodoxy by
citing In re Grimley.6 8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter cast a vote in favor of more
light; he was unwilling either to affirm or reverse without more and fuller
argument of the "questions of great delicacy and difficuty" that the case
presented.0 9 Nevertheless, he did not wait for a fuller canvass of the problem
to make the essentials of his position pretty clear:
I cannot agree that the only inquiry that is open on an appli-
cation for habeas corpus challenging a sentence of a military tribunal
is whether that tribunal was legally constituted and had jurisdic-
tion, technically speaking, over the person and the crime. Again,
I cannot agree that the scope of inquiry is the same as that open to
us on review of State convictions; the content of due process in
civil trials does not control what is due process in military trials.
Nor is the duty of the civil courts upon habeas corpus met simply
when it is found that the military sentence has been reviewed by
the military hierarchy, although in a debatable situation we should
no doubt attach more weight to the conclusions reached on con-
troversial facts by military appellate courts than to those reached
by the highest court of a state.7°
On petition for rehearing he added a significant gloss to his first
opinion; demanding "well-focused argument and careful deliberation before
65. Id. at 142.
66. Id. at 142-44.
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id. at 146-47.
69. Id. at 148-49. As in the cases involving court-martial jurisdiction over civilians,
the size of the problem was much magnified in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's mind by the
fact that life was at stake. Comp Lre Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 41 (1956) (concurring
opinion) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (Harlan,
J. dissenting with Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. 346 U.S. at 149.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
enunciating the principle that a conviction by a constitutional court which
lacked due process is open to attack by habeas corpus while an identically
defective conviction when rendered by an ad hoc military trubunal is in-
vulnerable," 71 he made it clear that he saw no reason for treating the prin-
ciple of Johnson v. Zerbst-the principle that jurisdiction may be "lost"
by a denial of whatever process is due in the circumstances-as any less
applicable to military than to civil courts.
Justices Black and Douglas, though what they had to say seems not at
bottom very different from the Frankfurter dicta, flatly dissented.72 They
saw no need for reargument to persuade them that some, if not all, of the
rights conferred by the fifth and sixth amendments applied to soldiers ;7
if not, they asked, why did the draftsmen of the fifth amendment think it
necessary explicitly to except cases arising in the land or naval forces from
the requirement of a presentment or indictment of a grand jury? The Court,
they went on to say, had in fact already held in Wade v. Hunter" that the
double jeopardy provision of that amendment was applicable to military
proceedings; and surely the right not to be compelled to be a witness
against oneself is not less fundamental. Therefore, it was not enough that
the military authorities might have given fair consideration to the constitu-
tional question; the petitioners were entitled to a judicial hearing on the
circumstances surrounding their confessions, and to have those circum-
stances tested by the standards of due process formulated by the Supreme
Court-not merely by whatever standards might have been formulated by
Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Unfortunately, the reasoning of the dissent lent little or no force to
its conclusion, however right that conclusion may be. In the first place,
the textual argument is very infirm, if only because it proves a great deal
too much. By a parity of reasoning it could be shown that the framers
of the Bill of Rights intended to apply to courts-martial the sixth amend-
ment's requirement for "all criminal prosecutions" of an "impartial [petty]
jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been committed"
-an obviously impossible construction, not favored by either Mr. Justice
Black or Mr. Justice Douglas. 75 Moreover, the exclhsio unius rule of con-
71. 346 U.S. 851.
72. 346 U.S. at 150.
73. Justices Black and Douglas were no strangers to this concept of an adjustable
Bill of Rights, for they had earlier suggested in the course of their dissent in Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1949), that some, but not all, parts of the Bill of
Rights applied to the actions of American Military Government in occupied foreign
territory. Cf. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 939, rehearing denied, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
74. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
75. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957) ; Duke & Vogel, The Coustituiln&
and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L.
REv. 435, 441 (1960).
[Vol. 61 : 40
HeinOnline -- 61 Colum. L. Rev. 54 1961
54 [ l. :
t i t i a c stit t
lacked due process is open to attack s r s il i
defective conviction e re ere d ilit i
vulnerable,"71 he ade it clear that e s r t ti t
ciple of J hnson . r st-the i i l ll
by a denial of hatever process is e i t ir t - l
applicable t ilitar t t i il t .
Justices lack and ouglas, t t t t t
botto very different fro t e ra f rter i t , fl tl i t .72
sa no need for reargu ent t ers a e tl1 t t , i
rights conferred by the fifth and sixth a end ents a lie t s l i rs j73
if not, they asked, hy did the drafts en of t e fift t t i it
necessary explicitly to except cases arisi i t l l
the require ent of a present ent or i ict e t f r j r t,
they ent on to say, had in fact alrea l i . mzt r74
double jeopardy r isi f t t t
proceedings; and surely the ri t t t ll t
against oneself is not less funda ental. herefore, it as t t t
the ilitary authorities ight have given fair c si erati t t tit -
tional question; t e titi rs r titl
circu stances surrounding their c fessi s, t t
stances tested by the standards of due process for ulated t r
ourt-not erely by hatever sta ar s i t l t
ongress in t e if r ilit .
f rt atel , t r i t
its conclusion, ho ever right that c cl si . t ,
the textual argu ent is very infir , if l eca se it r s r t l
too uch. y a parity of reas i it l t t t
of the ill of ights i te e t l t rts- artial -
ent's require ent for "all cri inal prosecutions" f i rti l tt
jury of the State and istrict herein t e cri e s ll itt "
-an obviously i possible construction, t f r it
Black or r. Justice ouglas.75 oreover, t e lusi mzi s r l
71. 346 .S. 851.
72. 346 . . t .
73. Justices lack and ouglas ere no stra ers t t is t f j t l
Bill of Rights, for they had earlier suggested i t e rse f t ir i t i
v. isentrager, 339 . . , ( 949), t t , t t ll, rts t ill f
Rights applied to the actions of erican ilitar er ent i ie r i n
territory. Cf. Best v. United States, 184 2d 131, 138 ( st ir. 50), crt. Cl/i ,
0 . . , i /li , (1951).
. . . 949).
75. ee eid . ert, . . , . 57) ; uke ogel, n titlll rm
a/Id the Standing Ar y: Another roble of ourt- artial hlrisdictiOll, D.
v. , ( 960).
1961] COLLATERAL REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL 55
struction is, after all, no more than an aid in deciphering the intention of
those responsible for the amendments; and, since the Burns case was de-
cided, Colonel Wiener has convincingly demonstrated that the fathers of
the Bill of Rights never supposed that any part of it applied to soldiers-
which, of course, as Colonel Wiener emphasized, does not mean that no
part of it should today be held to apply to military trials. 76 Secondly, Wade
v. Hunter simply is not authority for the proposition for which the dissenters
cited it, for what it actually held was no more than that "under the circum-
stances shown, the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision did not
bar petitioner's trial before the second court-martial," because that second
trial "was not the kind of double jeopardy within the intent of the Fifth
Amendment."7 7 Four years later, indeed, in Reid v. Covert,78 Mr. Justice Black,
in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, buttressed his con-
clusion that courts-martial could not constitutionally be used for the trial
of civilians by animadverting on the inadequate constitutional protection
afforded the accused in such proceedings. By way of illustration he pointed
out that "in Swaim v. United States . . . this Court held that the Presi-
dent or commanding officer had power to return a case to a court-martial
for an increase in sentence. If the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth
Amendment were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional."' 9
Since Wade v. Hunter was not so much as mentioned, it may be inferred
that the dissenters in Burns had had second thoughts about the meaning
of that case.
V. TEE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The question of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to military
trials, which, of course, lies at the root of the question of the scope of
76. See Wiener, Canrts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72
HARV. L. REV. 266, 298-302 (1958). But see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Con-
stitutirn: The Original Understanding, 71 H.Av. L. REv. 293 (1957).
77. 336 U.S. at 688-89, 690. The Court reasoned that, just as the double jeopardy
provision leaves to a civil judge broad discretion to terminate a trial before final judg-
ment, whenever he thinks that justice requires such a termination, so the military
authorities must be given some leeway in deciding when the circumstances-including
the military tactical situation-justify starting a court-martial all over again, perhaps
before a different court. In the Wade case, a court-martial of the 76th division recessed
to permit the calling of additional witnesses; by the time the witnesses were obtained,
the 76th division, including all the personnel of the court, had advanced far to the
east of the scene of the crime and the residence of the witnesses. Accordingly, the
charges were referred to Fifteenth Army, whose headquarters had moved into that
vicinity. The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black, does seem to assume
the applicability of the double jeopardy provision; but a footnote states that, "Our
holding that under the circumstances here the Fifth Amendment did not bar trial by
the second court-martial makes it unnecessary to consider . . . to what extent a court-
martial's overruling of a plea of former jeopardy is subject to collateral attack in
habeas corpus proceedings." Id. at 688 n.4. The dissenting Justices, including Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, thought that the effect of the Court's decision was to deprive Wade "of
his right under the Constitution to be free from being twice subjected to trial for the
same offense." Id. at 694.
78. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
79. Id. at 37 n.68.
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review of such trials by the civil courts, is thus left in considerable doubt.
It seems safe to assume that the dictum of Mr. Chief justice Chase that
"the power of Congress in the government of the land and naval forces
and of the militia, is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amend-
ment,"8 0 is not the law today, if it ever was ;81 it is now reasonably certain
that soldiers have some constitutional rights, that they are entitled to some
minimum of due process which the courts will defend against encroachment
by either Congress or the military authorities. What is not so clear is
whether the quantum of due process to which the Constitution entitles them
is large enough to have much practical significance.
Argument about the applicability of the Bill of Rights to courts-martial
looks, from one standpoint, largely academic, because only a few of the ex-
plicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights, other than those relating to grand
and petty juries, have not been granted to members of the armed forces
by Congress.82 The basic, explicit protections are all present and accounted
for: thus, the Uniform Code prohibits compulsory self-incrimination, double
jeopardy, and cruel or unusual punishments ;83 the accused must be apprised
of the charges against him; he is to be assisted by counsel of his choice
and to have the benefit of compulsory process.8 4 It is the duty of the military
reviewing authorities, the Boards of Review and the Court of Military Ap-
peals, to see to it that these and other aspects of "military due process," 85
such as the outlawing of attempts by commanding officers to influence the
action of a court-martial, 86 are strictly observed. Normally, of course, they
80. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 138 (1867) (concurring opinion).
81. "As yet it has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and
other protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials." Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957). But see Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1953).
82. The principal exceptions are the right to be admitted to bail and the right
to confrontation. Bail has never been known to the military law. See United States
ex rel. Watkins v. Vissering, Misc. No. 722, E.D. Va., June 10, 1960; WINTHROP,
MmITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 114 (2d ed. 1920). Article 49(d) of the Uniform Code
permits the use of depositions in non-capital cases but has recently been construed to
require, even in such cases, that the accused and his counsel be present at the taking
of the deposition, on the ground that a literal construction would "lend itself" to con-
flict with the sixth amendment requirement of confrontation. United States v. Jacoby,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 428,29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
83. 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 844, 855 (1958). There may be some significance in the fact
that, whereas the eighth amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," the
Uniform Code bars "cruel or unusual punishment" [emphasis added]. Until the Civil
War, some military punishments, such as flogging and branding, were cruel but far
from unusual; others, such as shaving the head or causing the offender to wear a
barrel, were more unusual than cruel. See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
437-42 (2d ed. 1920).
84. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830 (b), 838, 846.
85. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
86. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1958). The Court of Military Appeals recently reversed a
conviction on a charge of uttering forged checks because, inter alia, it thought that this
article had been violated by the commanding officer's promulgation, some time before
of a bull on "Dishonored Checks," deploring their incidence in the command and
exhorting recomputation of the bank balance immediately after the writing of a check.
United States v. Olson, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 286, 29 C.M.R. 102 (1960).
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do so, sometimes with a zeal which strikes some observers as verging on the
excessive.
87
But, from another standpoint, the provenance of the soldier's rights,
and the identity of the tribunal that enforces them, may have genuine im-
portance. As competent and conscientious as the military, reviewing authori-
ties created by Congress may be in normal times, it is precisely in abnormal
times that military justice is put to its severest tests and that those re-
sponsible for its administration are least likely to be skilled in military law
and most likely to be tempted to subordinate fairness to seeming expediency.
The history of American military justice has for this reason followed a
cyclic pattern, like most other aspects of American military policy. After
every war there are loud and sometimes justified squawks about the un-
necessary roughness of martial courts and cops, followed by a tremendous
87. The delicate perceptions of the present Court of Military Appeals, or at least
of two of its three members, have sniffed out fatal denials of due process in situations
in which their presence would probably not have been noticed by most civilian judges.
Thus, to select a couple of recent examples, the failure of one defense counsel to
proffer certain evidence that the majority of the Court of Military Appeals thought
would have been mitigating, and the decision of another not to make a particular defense
that he thought devoid of merit-in each case in circumstances in which the dissenting
judge thought reasonable lawyers might differ as to the preferable trial tactics for the
defense-were found by the majority of the court to evidence such negligence, incom-
petence, or indifference to the client's welfare as to amount to a denial of the assist-
ance of counsel. United States v. Huff, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 397, 29 C.M.R. 213 (1960);
United States v. Home, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 26 C.M.R. 381 (1958). An equally in-
teresting example of tender solicitude for the accused's rights is United States v. Allen,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 29 C.M.R. 355 (1960), in which the same majority of the court
reversed on the ground, inter alia, that the substantial rights of the accused were
prejudiced by a prosecutor's reference in his closing peroration to a scene in a best-
selling novel, "Anatomy of a Murder," in which a defense lawyer artfully stimulates
his client to "remember" episodes supporting his defense of insanity. By ordinary civilian
standards of permissible prosecution rhetoric, this literary allusion seems comparatively
mild. Thus, in a mail fraud case in which the prosecuting attorney had denounced a
defendant as an "adept prevaricator," "the most successful faker in the history of fakery,"
a "cheat," a "charlatan," and a "religious racketeer," a majority of the Court of
Appeals opined that "if the conduct of the prosecution in argument in this case con-
stitutes error, then the prosecution in every case is limited to a listless, vigorless sum-
mation of fact in Chesterfieldian politeness. Gone are the days of the great advocates
whose logic glowed and flowed with the heat of forensics " Ballard v. United States,
152 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); cf.
Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925). Were the sensitivity displayed
by the present Court of Military Appeals applied by civilian courts of appeal to the
conduct of the ordinary criminal trial in an inferior state court, we should probably wit-
ness something approximating a general jail delivery. Nor has the Court of Military
Appeals hesitated to strike down provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which
embodies the President's regulations implementing the Uniform Code, as violative of
military due process. United States v. Haynes, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 792, 27 C.M.R. -60 (1958) ;
see Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical Study of
Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L Rxv. 861, 878-82 (1959). On
the other hand, under article 67 (d) of the Uniform Code, the Court of Military Ap-
peals "shall take action only with respect to matters of law," which means that the
military Board of Review is the last appellate body having authority to determine such
questions of fact as the voluntariness of a confession. United States v. Stivers, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 512, 29 C.M.R. 328 (1960). But since the Court of Military Appeals may
(and often does) find that a confession was involuntary as a matter of law, and since
the line between questions of fact and questions of law is no better defined in military
than civil law, this limitation on its power of review may not have much practical
significance.
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pother in Congress, followed by a grand general renovation of the Articles
of War, followed by profound public apathy until the next emergency. 88
After each World War Congress stuffed the military code with humane
provisions intended to protect poor privates from high-handed injustice at
the hands of drumhead courts-martial composed of arrogant martinets-
some of them so protective as possibly to be unworkable in wartime condi-
tions8 9 and therefore likely at best to be unenthusiastically obeyed and at
worst to be systematically evaded. Experience suggests that a better guar-
antee of fundamental fairness in military trials is the existence of some
degree of power, altogether outside the statutory system of military justice,
to enforce such fairness.
In short, in time of actual military emergency it may make a great deal
of difference whether the civilian courts or the military authorities are to
have the ultimate right to decide if a soldier accused of crime has in fact
received whatever process is due him. At least to the extent that those
rights stem not merely from a Congressional act of grace-which, it must
be remembered, can at any time be rescinded°°---but from the Constitution
itself, it is hard to see why the federal civil courts should be any more
backward in enforcing their observance in military trials than they are in
enforcing constitutional rights in state trials. Congress may have made the
Court of Military Appeals the final arbiter of the meaning of the Uniform
Code of Military justice, but the Supreme Court of the United States is
the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. 1
Viewed from this standpoint, the plurality opinion in Burns v. Wilson
seems to contain serious internal contradictions. It is all very well to say
that constitutional due process protects soldiers from "crude injustice," but
what if the crude injustice takes the form of a finding, in the teeth of the
evidence, that a coerced confession was voluntary and admissible? There
88. Who now remembers the First World War's Hard-Boiled Smith and his Paris
guardhouse, or even the Second's Colonel Kilian and his Lichfield guardhouse? Yet
the one contributed greatly, however unintentionally, to the 1920 revision of the Articles
of War, and the other did the same for the Uniform Code.
89. See THE UNrrED STATES COURT OF MiLiTARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVO-
cATEs GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 21, 29, 51 (1954).
90. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
91. Here, at the risk of sounding like Gertrude Stein, it ought to be reiterated that
the process which is due a soldier may be less than, or at least different from, that
which is due a civilian. Due process is not "the same in a military setting as it is in
a civil setting." Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Bazelon J., dis-
senting), affd sub norn. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), quoted with approval by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Burns v. Wilson, mupra at 149. For example, if in a civil
case an accused were confined in an unheated jail and inadequately fed, a confession
made in such circumstances might well be regarded as coerced; but a court might take
a different view in a military situation in which no more comfortable quarters were
to be had and the guards got no better rations than the prisoner. So in Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 (1949), assuming the applicability of the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment, the exigencies of the military situation were held to justify a second
trial which might well have been held unconstitutional in a civilian context.
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may be no more injustice in a naked refusal to listen than there is in a
patient, if bored, hearing of the accused's allegations, followed by an arbitrary
finding either that they are untrue or that they do not amount to a denial
of due process. Yet Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion may be interpreted
as meaning that anything short of "manifest refusal to consider" allega-
tions that due process has been denied is equivalent to dealing with them
"fully and fairly" 92 and that the Constitution protects a soldier against
nothing more than "a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing
guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness." Such language might im-
pose a significant limitation on, say, Dr. Castro's notions of a proper mili-
tary trial, but very few modern American trials, military or civilian, no matter
how unfair by our standards, could measure down to such a test.
There seems thus to be nothing in Burns v. Wilson, even if the Chief
Justice's opinion had been an opinion of the Court, which in practice would
require a district court to apply to collateral review of a court-martial con-
viction any test more exacting than the traditional one of jurisdiction over
the person and offense and power to impose the sentence. But if there
are few, if any, records showing that the military 'authorities literally "re-
fused to consider'" allegations of unfairness, there are some that may raise
a substantial question whether the consideration was "full and fair." Treat-
ing the principal opinion in the Burns case as the controlling precedent, a
court may simply and summarily dismiss a petition on the ground that
the military did not refuse to consider its allegations or it may, with equal
ease and upon the same authority, stress the requirement that military
consideration shall have been full and fair.
No appreciable clarification is to be found in the two subsequent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court considering soldiers' petitions for habeas corpus.
In those cases93 the petitioners had been convicted of murder and attempted
rape and sentenced to life imprisonment, the minimum sentence for murder.
Since court-martial procedure requires a single gross sentence,94 regardless
of the number of charges of which the accused may have been convicted,
there was no separate sentence for the attempted rape, and no way of tell-
ing what sentence the court-martial would have imposed for that crime
92. This appears to be the interpretation placed on the opinion by the Department
of the Army and the Department of Justice. See Brief for the Respondent, p. 6, Burns
v. Looney, No. 2699 H.C., D. Kan., April 13, 1959, aff'd sub nor. Burns v. Taylor,
274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959), in which it is uncompromisingly asserted that "the law
[is] that civil courts, on habeas corpus, will consider claims of military prisoners that
they were denied constitutional rights only if the military tribunals vmnifestly refuse
to consider such claims."
93. Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957) ; Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583
(1957).
94. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 8a, at 521 (1951); see Ed-
wards v. Madigan, 281 F.2d 73, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1960); Noter Habeas Corpus Review
of Military "Gross Sentence" Usage, 65 YALE L.J. 413 (1956).
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alone. The Board of Review, affirming only the conviction for attempted
rape, imposed a 20 year sentence, which was the maximum allowable for
that crime. There were no allegations that the conviction was tainted by
any unfairness, and the sole question was whether the Uniform Code em-
powered the Board so to impose what the petitioner argued to be a new
sentence rather than a modification of a court-martial sentence-a question
well within the civil court's traditional jurisdiction to pass upon the power
to impose a sentence.9 5 A majority of the Court held the sentence authorized
by the Code and refused to consider its harshness, complained of by one
petitioner, on the unexceptionable ground that such matters are wholly
within the discretion of the military. They saw no constitutional question,
and they put no gloss on Burns v. Wilson.9
VI. COLLATERAL REVIEW IN THE LOWER COURTS SINCE Burns v. Wilson
The rich variety of opinions expressed by the Supreme Court may help
to account for the fact that the reported opinions of the lower federal courts
since Burns v. Wilson, although numerous, do not lend themselves to facile
taxonomy. They have, indeed, one striking common feature; in not one
of them did a soldier-petitioner succeed in obtaining his liberty.9 7 Perhaps
it is possible to make another significant generalization: the courts, whatever
disclaimers they may voice, do in fact usually examine the record with
care to see if there is support for allegations of unfairness. Thus, it may
be suggested that the monotony of result is attributable not so much to
judicial abnegation of power to review the fairness of military proceedings
as to the simple fact that, in the more or less peaceful conditions which have
prevailed since the Korean armistice, such proceedings, original and ap-
95. See Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1960).
96. The four dissenting Justices, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
Douglas and Brennan, thought that the court-martial had not dealt "fully and fairly
with the petitioners, because its Law Officer gave the members of the court no in-
structions concerning the punishment that could be imposed for attempted rape-which
suggests that these Justices thought the correctness of a court-martial's instruction
on the law to be within the proper scope of collateral review. See text accompanying
notes 109, 129 infra.
97. This statement requires a minor caveat, for two limited successes were scored.
One petitioner induced a civil court to swallow the exceedingly dubious proposition
that provision in the Articles of War for "imprisonment for life" gave a court-martial
no authority to direct confinement at hard labor. McKinney v. Finletter, 205 F.2d 760
(10th Cir. 1953). A subsequent attempt by the same petitioner to recover his liberty
as well as his leisure failed. McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1959),
cer. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960). In another case, the court, although it found no
defects in the petitioner's conviction, held that changing the place of confinement from
a federal reformatory to a federal penitentiary amounted to an increase in the sentence,
in contravention of the Uniform Code, and that the petitioner was entitled to be trans-
ferred to an institution of the former type. Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D.
Kan. 1959) ; cf. Kelly v. Hunter, 80 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1948) aff'd seb noin. Yates
v. Hunter, 174 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1949). These, of course, were essentially questions
of the military authorities' power to impose particular sentences and so by any test
were fair subjects for collateral review.
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pellate, have typically been at least as fair as the Bill of Rights, assuming
its applicability, would require them to be. None of the opinions leaves
the reader with any conviction that the outcome would have been different
if a civilian trial had been involved and the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst
applied to its fullest extent. Nevertheless, the application by the lower
federal courts of the principles, such as they are, laid down by the Supreme
Court deserves attention. Should military justice again be faced with the
unpeaceful conditions that produced the last crop of hard cases, these are
the precedents that the civil courts will presumably have to follow, dis-
tinguish, or overrule when they are called on to undertake collateral review
of military sentences.
Habeas corpus, though by far the commonest, is not the only method
of collateral review. There are a sizeable group of cases in which the
military convict seeks some relief other than the preservation of his life
or the restoration of his liberty. He may, for example, bring a suit for
back pay in the Court of Claims on the theory that a court-martial sen-
tence expelling him from the service was a nullity. The celebrated Shapiro
case, decided shortly after World War II, was a spectacularly successful
example of such a suit. In that case the Courts of Claims, finding gross
violations of the plaintiff's rights under the fifth and sixth amendments,
notably denial of the effective assistance of counsel, concluded that his
court-martial conviction was void and the sentence of dismissal conse-
quently illegal.98 It has been suggested that the subsequent enactment of
article 76 of the Uniform Code,99 purporting to make court-martial sen-
tences binding on all courts of the United States, may have deprived at least
the Court of Claims, a legislative court, of jurisdiction collaterally to re-
view courts-martial. 0 0 Moreover, Burns v. Wilson may be thought to
limit the force as precedent of the Shapiro case-although it is a somewhat
odd fact that neither the principal opinion, the dissent, nor any of the
briefs in Burns v. Wilson so much as mentioned Shapiro.'0' Despite these
considerations, the Court of Claims itself showed no inclination to retreat
from the view that a substantial denial of constitutional rights operated as
effectively to divest a court-martial of jurisdiction as a civil court,10 2 until
very recently when Mr. Justice Reed, sitting as a judge of the Court of
98. Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct Cl. 1947); see note 26 supra;
cf. United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907).
99. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1958). Article 76 was preceded, in 1948, by an amendment
of the Articles of War, of similar purport. 64 Stat 635 (1948).
100. See Wiener, The New Articles of War, Infantry J., Sept. 1948, p. 24, at p. 29;
Pasley, stpra note 4, at 34.
101. See separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
844, 847-48 (1953).
102. See Griffiths v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 691, 693 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 865 (1959).
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Claims, obliquely suggested that, should a case be presented in which a
court-martial had not given "fair consideration to petitioner's constitutional
rights," article 76 might require that court to reconsider the question of
its jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on a final judgment of a
court-martial.
0 3
For those whose grievances can be assuaged neither by the great writ
nor by an action for back pay, there remains the possibility of an action
for a judgment declaratory of the invalidity of a court-martial sentence'
0 '
or even an action for wrongful imprisonment. 10
But petitions for habeas corpus have naturally furnished most of the
occasions for the lower courts to peer into the somewhat clouded crystal
ball of Hiatt v. Brown and Burns v. Wilson, and it is principally the de-
cisions in those cases that will help or hinder collateral review of military
justice in any future emergency. The interesting question, of course, is the
extent to which lower federal courts have continued to treat courts-martial
as a class apart and their verdicts as peculiarly privileged.
At the outset, failure to assert a claim of unfairness in the original
proceeding, including its appellate phases, is likely to be a worse stumbling
block for the military than for the civilian petitioner, if only because it is
hard to say that the military authorities "refused to consider," or did not
fully and fairly consider, a point that was never urged upon them. A num-
103. Begalke v. United States, No. 159-55, Ct. Cl., Jan. 20, 1960, cert. denied, 81
Sup. Ct. 108 (1960).
104. Jackson v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958). The plaintiff, an
officer, had been sentenced to a substantial forfeiture of pay and "to lose 250 unre-
stricted numbers." The exact nature of the latter esoteric punishment, which is found
only in the Navy and Marine Corps, see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
1f 126 (1951), is not wholly clear to me, but it obviously dealt a heavy blow to plaintiff's
chances of promotion and could hardly be corrected by either habeas corpus or a suit
in the Court of Claims. The district court, although it found no merit in the conten-
tion that the convening authority was an "accuser" within the meaning of articles 1(11)
and 22(b) of the Uniform Code, and that the court-martial had therefore had no
jurisdiction, assumed that an action for a declaratory judgment was a proper way of
attacking the court-martial's jurisdiction. Contra, Brown v. Royall, 81 F. Supp. 767
(D.D.C. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952 (1950). Compare Harmon v. Brucker, 355
U.S. 579 (1958); Ives v. Franke, 271 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965
(1959). The District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus to the appropriate official. Cf. Olenick v. Brucker, 173 F. Supp. 493
(D.D.C.), order set aside and case remanded, 273 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 69 YALE
L.J. 474 (1960).
105. McLean v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.S.C. 1947); cf. Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 78 F. Supp. 421
(D. Hawaii 1947). Alley v. Chief, Finance Center, U.S. Army, 167 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.
Ind. 1958), defies procedural classification. The plaintiff, an officer who had been sen-
tenced to dismissal, total forfeitures, and ten years imprisonment, apparently attacked
only the sentence of dismissal, on the marvelously implausible ground that, the court-
martial having by a lapsus linguae sentenced him to be "dishonorably discharged," the
proper form for an enlisted man, neither the court nor the convening authority could
thereafter correct the sentence to "dismissal," the proper form for an officer; he sought
an order requiring the defendant to disburse to him all of his pay and allowances for
the period subsequent to the allegedly invalid dismissal. The court, treating this idiosyn-
cratic piece of pleading as a petition for a writ of mandamus, held that it had no
jurisdiction to grant such relief.
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ber of courts have cited such failure as a reason, usually of the "further-
more" variety, for the rejection of various claims of unfairness-including
one that the appointed defense counsel was incompetent or indifferent. 0 6
Assuming the truth of an assertion that appointed defense counsel was in-
different or incompetent, it seems quixotic to refuse to hear it because that
counsel failed to urge upon the military authorities his own stupidity, ignor-
ance, or laziness.
This claim that the petitioner's defense was of such low calibre as to
amount to a denial of his constitutional and statutory rights to the assist-
ance of counsel seems to be the favorite allegation. 0 7 Most of the other
claims familiar in civilian habeas corpus petitions are also plentiful in the
military variety, along with a few that seem to be peculiar to the soldiers.
A random sampling reveals allegations that rights under the constitution
and/or the Uniform Code were violated by the admission of coerced con-
fessions, 08 by errors in the Law Officer's instructions on the law 0 9 and
rulings on evidence, 110 by conviction upon insufficient evidence,"' by denial
106. E.g., Kubel v. Minton, 275 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1960); McKinney v. Warden,
273 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960) ; Bennett v. Davis, 267
F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1957) ; Suttles v.
Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Casey v. Taylor, No. 2808 H.C., D. Kan., Feb. 29,
1960, aff'd, 281 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1960); Bennett v. Cox, No. 2951 H.C., June 28,
1960; Bowerman v. Cox, No. 2869 H.C., D. Kan., March 14, 1960; Tillery v. Cox,
No. 2863 H.C., D. Kan., March 14, 1960; Wilson v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 324 (M.D.
Pa. 1955) ; Allen v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1955). The Government has
asserted that the "manifest refusal" language of Burns v. Wilson entails as a necessary
corollary a rule that "if an available contention is not asserted within the military ap-
pellate structure, it may not thereafter be raised on habeas corpus." Brief for the Re-
spondent, p. 6, Burns v. Looney, No. 2699 H-.C., D. Kan., April 13, 1959, aff'd sub nom.
Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959).
107. See, e.g., Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959); McKinney v.
Warden, supra note 106; Bennett v. Davis, supra note 106-; Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d
365 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Tillery v. Cox, supra note 106; Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456
(D. Kan. 1959); Day v. Wilson, 155 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1957); Allen v. Wilkinson,
supra note 106.
108. E.g., Rushing v. Wilkinson, supra note 107; Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958) ; Dixon v. United States, 237 F.2d
509 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Hurt v. Davis,
No. 2821 H.C., D. Kan., April 19, 1960.
109. E.g., Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956);
Bowerman v. Cox, No. 2869 H.C., D. Kan., March 14, 1960; Richards v. Cox, 184
F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1960).
110. E.g., Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959); Day v. Davis, supra
note 109; see Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1958).
111. E.g., Bowerman v. Cox, No. 2869 H.C., D. Kan., March 14, 1960; Sweet v.
Taylor, supra note 110; Allen v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1955). Tradi-
tionally, of course, district courts do not upon petitions for habeas corpus review in
either military or civil cases the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt. See Humphrey v.
Smith, 336 U.S. 695,' 696 (1949). But we have recently learned that a state court
conviction which is "totally devoid of evidentiary support" is unconstitutional under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960). There seems to be no reason why such a conviction should not
be equally a denial of due process under the fifth amendment, which of course is
applicable to federal proceedings, causing loss of jurisdiction under the principle of
Johnson v. Zerbst. See Blevens v. Taylor, No. 2757 H.C., D. Kan., April 27, 1960.
There is a time-honored, although probably apocryphal, legend among judge Ad-
vocates that a court-martial once sentenced an ac-used in the following form of words:
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of the right of confrontation, 1 12 and by conducting the trial in an atmos-
phere of public hostility and prejudice.113  This last is a problem which
may be genuine and perplexing when courts-martial sit overseas, be-
cause the military authorities, including those who are members of the
court, cannot easily exclude from their minds the consideration that ex-
emplary punishment of a culprit may mitigate the evil effect of the crime
upon relations between United States forces and local civilians. Like-
wise I find charges that the incompetence of the interpreter precluded a
fair trial ;114 that the petitioner was denied a speedy trial"5 or given one
speedier than he wanted;116 that cruel and unusual punishment was in-
flicted;117 that the failure of the President, when confirming a death sen-
tence, to hear the accused in person was a denial of the process to which
the latter was entitled under article 70(a) of the Uniform Code;118 and
that the alleged failure of the Court of Military Appeals to follow its own
precedents deprived petitioner of the equal protection of the laws.1 0 In
view of the prominence of the issue in civilian cases, it may at first blush
seem surprising that in only one case since 1953 has a Negro petitioner at-
tacked a conviction on the ground that no Negro sat on the court-martial
which tried him.120 The explanation is probably the exceedingly simple one
that there is in fact no evidence of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
membership of courts-martial.
Could the last allegation be made with any tincture of plausibility, it
might compel a court really to consider the meaning of the dictum, so fre-
quent as to be almost a judicial commonplace, that "due process of law for
military personnel is what Congress has provided for them in the military
"In view of the fact that there is no evidence of your guilt, you are sentenced to only
two years' confinement at hard labor."
112. Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953).
113. Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Hurt v. Davis, No. 2821 H.C.,
D. Kan., April 19, 1960. Each of these courts-martial sat in a foreign country (Austria
and Okinawa, respectively), and each involved a brutal crime against one of the
local population.
114. Young v. Brucker, No. 2567 H.C., D. Kan., June 2, 1960 (dictum).
115. Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1956). The court thought that a delay
of eight months in preparing charges was not unreasonable in view of the chaotic con-
ditions attending the evacuation of Seoul.
116. Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
117. Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953). This particular complaint
was probably not made with any serious hope of success, for the sentence (10 years
confinement at hard labor) was well within the maximum allowable for the particular
offenses under the Code and the Table of Maximum Punishments promulgated there-
under by the President.
118. Hurt v. Davis, No. 2821 H.C., D. Kan., April 19, 1960; Day v. Wilson, 155
F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1957).
119. Day v. Wilson, supra note 118.
120. Wilson v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Pa. 1955). A similar conten-
tion was made with similar lack of success in one other case, decided some years
before Burns v. Wilson. See Jackson v. Gough, 170 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 938 (1949).
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hierarchy in courts established according to law.'' This statement appears
to mean that if a particular protection cannot be found in the Uniform
Code, it does not exist for members of the armed forces. Although the
Uniform Code includes most of the explicit guarantees contained in the
Bill of Rights, and although the present Court of Military Appeals un-
doubtedly makes an effort to shape its concept of "military due process"
according to the models furnished by the Supreme Court in civilian cases,'
2
the Code falls far short of spelling out all the gloss placed on the due
process clause by the Supreme Court. If a conviction by a court-martial
from which Negroes had been systematically excluded should ever reach
the Supreme Court, I do not think that Justices Black and Douglas would
be alone in finding the conviction unconstitutional. Yet it would be hard
to point to any provision of the Uniform Code which was violated by such
exclusion. In short, it is probably not true that Congress could, if it wanted
to, include in its military criminal code a provision plainly inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court; and by the same
token it is probably not true that a protection granted by the Bill of Rights,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is inapplicable to soldiers simply
because it is not included in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as
interpreted by the Court of Military Appeals.123  The seemingly contrary
121. Mr. Justice Minton, concurring in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 147 (1953).
Compare Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911) ("to those in the military
or naval service of the United States the military law is due process") ; Burns v. Taylor,
274 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1959) ("due process of law as contemplated and vouch-
safed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice"); Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17
(10th Cir. 1959) ("every constitutional safeguard contemplated by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice"); White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 1954) ("to
members of the military forces due process means the application of the procedure of
military law").
122. E.g., United States v. Curtin, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 26 C.M.R. 207 (1958) (re-
versing conviction for violation of a lawful order by one not shown to have actual
knowledge thereof, upon the authority of Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957));
United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). The Court of
Military Appeals, though it describes itself as "the Supreme Court of the military
justice system," qualifies this supremacy-and perhaps concedes to the Supreme Court
a jurisdiction rather broader than that Court has so far been disposed to claim for
itself-by adding, "subject only to review by the Supreme Court of the United States
on constitutional issues." See United States v. Armbruster, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598,
(1960).
123. Frontal attacks on the constitutionality of the procedural provisions of the
Uniform Code and its predecessors have been rare and unsuccessful. In Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 (1949), the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the con-
stitutionality of the double jeopardy provision of old Article of War 40 (article
44 of the present Code, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1958)), which provided that no proceeding
should be deemed to be a "trial" until the reviewing and confirming authorities should
have taken final action. One bold petitioner recently asserted that the entire Uniform
Code is unconstitutional; the district court thought otherwise. United States ex rel.
Watkins v. Vissering, Misc. No. 722, E.D. Va., June 10, 1960. Another petitioner
argued that since the Articles of War required a majority of two-thirds of the court
for conviction, and of three-quarters for sentencing, at least one member of the court
who believed the accused innocent might be compelled to vote upon the sentence,
thereby going against his conscience, in violation of his first amendment right to free-
dom of conscience. But the court had its doubts about the accused's right to vindicate
whatever violence may have been done to the conscience of members of the court-
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dicta are probably best to be taken as infelicitous efforts to express the
very different and entirely sound idea that while the Bill of Rights may
in principle apply to soldiers and civilians alike, it does not necessarily
give the infantry the same rights that it gives civilians, any more than it
confers upon infants the same rights that it does upon adults. The exigencies
of the military service may very well justify proceedings which would be
unfair if applied to a civilian, or to a soldier in time of peace.
124
If the Constitution does confer on members of the military some right
to a fair trial and does not leave either to Congress or the military authorities
the last word in defining that minimum standard of fairness, it follows that
the federal courts have on collateral review some power to inquire into
the fairness of court-martial proceedings, and that that power ought not
to be limited to a mechanical examination of the record to see whether the
point was "considered" by the military. At least until the Supreme Court
tells us more, the key question is the content that the inferior federal courts
will put into the adjectives "full and fair"; do they import nothing more
than good faith, or do they require that the conclusions of the military
tribunals be defensible?
The dicta of some of the lower courts manifest an inclination to dis-
tinguish between the military tribunals' findings of fact and the legal con-
clusions based on those facts. As phrased by a circuit judge sitting as a
district judge in the District of Kansas, "law courts are without
jurisdiction to review constitutional questions decided by military courts
dependent upon facts which have been found by the military courts, but
where the question is whether the admitted facts, as a matter of law, violate
constitutional guarantees or due process, the civil court has jurisdiction."'
12
It must be recognized that the civil courts, when asked to review military
determinations, labor under a considerable handicap; military science, in-
cluding the maintenance of discipline, sometimes entails formidable ex-
pertise, and the martial experience, if any, of the ordinary judge is likely
to be somewhat obsolete. Considerations such as these, it may be sup-
posed, underlie Mr. Justice Frankfurter's remark that, "[W]e should no
doubt attach more weight to the conclusions reached on controversial facts by
military appellate courts than to those reached by the highest court of a
State."'126 Such judicial modesty may be appropriate when the military
martial, and so this inspired effort of the imagination, as ingenious as it was uncon-
vincing, got nowhere. Ex parte Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y.), afI'd, 165 F.2d
213 (2d'Cir. 1947).
124. Cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) ; Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956).
125. Burns v. Looney, No. 2699 H.C., D. Kan., April 13, 1959, aft'd sub Ioam.
Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959); cf. Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633,
641 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Dixon v. United States, 237 F.2d 509, 510 (10th Cir. 1956).
126. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 149 (1953). But in his dissenting opinion on
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determination really does in one way or another relate to the demands of
the tactical situation, as when the petitioner challenges a transfer of charges
from one court-martial to another, or a determination that a particular
officer is not "available" for service as defense counsel, or a determination
that military necessity prevents the personal appearance of a witness, or
a delay in bringing the accused to trial in a theater of actual combat. But
there seems to be no compelling reason to extend this hesitance to problems
that lack any distinctively military flavor, such as whether an accused who
was beaten up by the military police has confessed voluntarily or whether
the record supports a finding that he was not in fact mishandled. Some
recent opinions, particularly in the crucial district of Kansas, 2 7 evince a
cautious disposition to reason that a military determination that is in the
civil court's judgment plainly at odds with the record cannot have been
based upon fair consideration. In the words of a senior circuit judge:
It is sometimes stated that if the military reviewing authorities
have considered and decided the constitutional question sought to
be raised in a habeas corpus case, then the matter is at an end,
and the civil court is without jurisdiction. In the court's view, that
statement is too broad. In Burns v. Wilson . . . it is stated that
'when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allega-
tion raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court
to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence.' However, if a
careful examination of the record compels a conclusion that there
is no evidence to sustain the judgment or that in fact petitioner
was not represented by an attorney, or that it must be said that
basic constitutional rights were violated, it would seem that a civil
court would have jurisdiction to grant relief because under such
circumstances it cannot be said that the reviewing military authori-
ties fairly considered these questions.'2 8
As a declaration of the rights of military man, this is certainly something
less than ringing. But however discreet its phrasing, it may nonetheless
the petition for rehearing, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that he expressed no opinion
"on the weight which should be given by the federal district court on habeas corpus
to the findings of the military reviewing authorities." Id. at 850.
127. Both the United States Disciplinary Barracks and the well known federal
penitentiary are located in Leavenworth.
128. Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. Kan. 1959) (Huxman, Senior Cir-
cuit Judge). Compare Young v. Brucker, No. 2567 H.C., D. Kan., June 2, 1958 ("The
court does have jurisdiction to examine the record to see whether there is basis in fact
for the findings by the military court."). The dicta quoted from the Sweet case are
somewhat difficult to reconcile with the attitude to military findings of fact which the
same judge had six months previously displayed in Burns v. Looney, No. 2699 H.C.,
D. Kan., April 13, 1959, aff'd mtb norn. Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959).
Another court has qualified the proposition that a civil court should not reevaluate the
evidence bearing on the voluntariness of a confession by the phrase, "at least when
the military court's evaluation is not so unreasonable as to shock one's- sense of jus-
tice." See Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633, 641 (5th Cir. 1959) ; cf. Richards v.
Cox, 184 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D. Kan. 1960) ("it is only when the overall picture pre-
sented by the record is offensive to the concepts of common justice and fairness that
a law court may intervene").
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
contain the seeds of a collateral review of the verdicts of courts-martial
comparable in breadth to that which has developed for cases involving state
prisoners since Johnson v. Zerbst was decided; many a majestic legal
oak has grown from an acorn no larger than this. True, the acorn still
lies dormant in the ground; it is a stubborn fact that in no case decided
after Burns v. Wilson has a soldier petitioner persuaded a court to grant
the writ. We cannot say in what circumstances a district court would find
such unfairness as to nullify the sentence of the military tribunal. It is
at least clear that the unfairness will have to have been pretty blatant
before the courts will grant what they evidently still consider an extraordinary
and radical remedy. It has been said that neither errors in the Law Officer's
instructions 129 nor prejudicial comment by the prosecutor'2 0 are enough
to rouse a civil court to action. The admission of evidence that the Supreme
Court has held inadmissible in federal criminal trials has also been held
to be "common and ordinary error," beyond the civil court's power to
review' 3 '-although the court did suggest that the result might be different
if instead of a single error, however damaging, the errors during a military
trial were "so numerous, glaring and persistent as to be offensive to our
concept of a fair trial and thus constitute a denial of due process"-which
sounds very much like a return to the philosophy of Hicks v. Hiatt.
0 2
More, the court hinted at the possibility that a "wilful and intentional"
admission of such testimony, that is, a wilful and intentional failure to ad-
129. Kubel v. Minton, 275 F.2d 789, 791 (4th Cir. 1959); Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d
379, 385 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956). For this purpose it is not
unfair to analogize the Law Officer's instructions to a civil court's charge to the jury.
See Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (1958) ; MANUAL
FOR COURTS-M&aRTI UNIrED STATES ff 73 (1951).
130. Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232, 235 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
927 (1958).
131. Burns v. Looney, No. 2699 H.C., D. Kan., April 13, 1959, aff'd stb norn. Burns
v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959). In the particular case the court-martial and
the military reviewing authorities, including the Court of Military Appeals, had per-
mitted the wife of the accused to testify against him, over his objection. The Court of
Military Appeals denied the petition for grant of review. United States v. Burns, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 834 (1955). Thereafter the Supreme Court held that it was error
to admit such evidence in a criminal trial in a federal court. Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 754 (1958). The Supreme Court's decision in the Hawkins case was not an
adjudication that the admission of the wife's testimony constituted a denial of con-
stitutional due process, but simply an exercise of its power to supervise the administra-
tion of criminal justice in the federal courts, a power that does not extend to courts-
martial. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 145 n.12 (1953). But the ruling of the
military tribunals was nonetheless wrong, in the light of hindsight, for article 36(a) of
the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1958), directs that the President shall, so far
as he deems practicable, and so far as is not inconsistent with other provisions of the
Code, prescribe for courts-martial "the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.. . ." The Manual for Courts-
Martial accordingly provides that courts-martial shall apply the federal courts' rules of
evidence, "so far as not otherwise prescribed," and there is nothing in the Manual that
would have sanctioned the wife's testimony in the circumstances of the case, the wife
not being the person injured by the husband's offense. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITm STATES 1111 137, 148e (1951).
132. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
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here to the rules of evidence recognized in the federal courts, might be a
denial of due process, even though the Supreme Court's rulings were no
more than an exercise of its power to supervise federal criminal justice
and not a determination that the exclusion of certain testimony was essen-
tial to due process.133 It seems clear, reading the opinion as a whole, that
the court did not suppose that errors in the admission or rejection of
evidence could not be a basis for finding a denial of due process, but simply
that the garden variety of error, such as courts daily commit, will not do.
Similarly, the Law Officer's instructions or the Trial Counsel's inflamma-
tory rhetoric might plumb such depths of ignorance or impropriety as to
cause a habeas corpus court to sit up and start talking in terms of funda-
mental unfairness, or even of shock to its sense of justice.
None of these cases offers bright hopes to the military prisoner as he
sits of evenings in his cell teaching himself the elements of constitutional
law and practicing the composition of petitions in forma pauperis. One
recent case, indeed, seems restrictive even by the traditional standard, for
it appears to hold that the military's construction of the law is no less im-
pregnable than its findings of fact, even when the court-martial's juris-
diction over the offense itself would seem to turn upon the reading of such
statutory language as "in time of war."' 34 No doubt there are situations
in which the military's interpretation of statutory language is entitled to
special weight, 3 5 but it has no obvious special competence to make the
133. See note 131 mpra. The problem would be more difficult if the President,
finding impracticable the application to courts-martial of a federal rule of evidence,
should prescribe a different rule in the Manual, and still more difficult if the Uniform
Code itself should prescribe a different rule. The former problem was actually pre-
sented to the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Haynes, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 792,
795-96, 27 C.M.R. 60, 63-64 (1958), which held "incorrect," as in conflict with Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), a provision of the Manual permitting the in-
troduction of evidence obtained indirectly by means of an inadmissible confession.
134. Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960). The accused had deserted
the Army in 1953, during the Korean hostilities, but was not brought before a court-
martial until 1959. Article 43 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 843 (1958), permits
trial for wartime desertion without limitation of time, but imposes a three-year limitation
on trial for desertion in time of peace. The accused contended that the Korean shooting
was not "war," so that his trial was barred. The court, considering that any error by
the military in applying the language of article 43 to the Korean conflict was an "or-
dinary" error of law, not affecting jurisdiction, refused to review the Army's con-
struction. No mention was made of a 1959 decision of the Supreme Court granting the
writ on the ground that the military tribunals had erred in holding that June 10, 1949,
was not "in time of peace" for the purposes of former Article of War 92, which de-
prived courts-martial of jurisdiction to try cases of murder or rape committed in the
United States in time of peace. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
135. Thus, the military authorities have traditionally been accorded wide, although
not unlimited, discretion to decide what sins are "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces" or "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces" and therefore within the denunciation of the general,
or catchall, article. Compare Blevens v. Taylor, No. 2757 H.C., D. Kan., April 27,
1960, in which the court held that while a court-martial is without jurisdiction to try
a violation of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958), a soldier who defected to the
East German government and participated in its propaganda activities was clearly
guilty of "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces," in violation
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
essentially political distinction between a "war" and a mere "police action."
The most that can be said-and it may prove to be a good deal-is
that since and despite Burns v. Wilson the inferior federal courts have
tended to reject the more extreme claims of the Government and to include
in their opinions dicta that at least preserve their freedom of maneuver;
conversely, they have on the whole been careful to limit their actual hold-
ings to the exact facts before them-facts that usually would not have justi-
fied collateral attack upon the verdict of a State court. Nothing in these
cases would preclude collateral relief if a sufficiently unpleasant set of facts
were alleged and established.
VII. CONCLUSION
I am of the opinion that this gradual edging away from the orthodox
doctrine and toward a practical homologizing of military and civil sentences
for the purposes of collateral review is very much to be desired. It is to
be hoped that the "manifest refusal" language will be allowed quietly to
fade away and that increasing stress will be put upon the words "full and
fair." I come to this opinion partly for the reason I have already given,
that the best guarantee of fundamental fairness in military trials, in all
circumstances, is the existence of a power, wholly independent of the mili-
tary organization, to enforce such fairness; partly because it is very un-
likely that the recognition of a power of collateral review equivalent to
that which is exercised over the criminal justice of the States would actually
lead to a different result in an appreciable number of cases' 30 or otherwise
seriously hamper military discipline, except in circumstances in which it
may need a little hampering; partly because there is something irrational
in what Mr. Justice Frankfurter describes as "the principle that a con-
viction by a constitutional court which lacked due process is open to attack
by habeas corpus while an identically defective conviction when rendered
by an ad hoc military tribunal is invulnerable."' 37 But the main reason for
my conviction that the civil courts should draw as little distinction as
possible between military and civil tribunals and between soldiers and other
citizens, is simply that, if there ever was a time when the Army could
rationally be described as a "separate community"' with a separate system
of government, 38 that time is long past. Most male citizens of the United
of article 134 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958). See Hagan, The General
Article-Elemental Confusion, Military L. Rev., Oct. 1960, p. 60, at p. 63.
136. "[W]ith the Court of Military Appeals reversing the worst cases, there will
not be many instances where a military accused who has exhausted the involved process
of the Uniform Code will find any genuine necessity for resorting to collater4l review
in a federal district court." Wiener, CMrts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice, 72 HARv. L Rm. 266, 302 (1958).
137. Separate opinion in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 851 (1953).
138. See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 389 (1902). Mr. Chief Justice
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States (and a fair number of the female ones) have a relation to the armed
forces as direct and personal as that of a citizen of Pericles' Athens or the
Roman Republic in the days of Cato the Censor. My objection to the
"separate community" idea is not simply that it does not square with the
facts. On the basis of the experience of many nations in many times, I
believe that concept to be actually pernicious, as is any way of thinking
which tends to make the armed services an enclave of the national polity
whose inhabitants are of other caste than the rest.
The United States has had no Dreyfus case. One reason is that in
fact, and despite their categorical pronouncements, it is unlikely that the
constitutional courts of the United States, if actually confronted with such
a record, would have taken water and washed their hands. Obviously, there
have got to be major differences between soldiers and civilians, including
differences in their respective systems of criminal justice. But our policy
should not be to maximize these differences so far a's that can be done
without outraging the courts' sense of justice, but rather to minimize them
so far as that can be done without impairing military efficiency.
Fuller, who had never been a soldier, thought this apartheid "essential to the mainten-
ance of that discipline which renders the Army efficient in war and morally progressive
in peace.... ." Ibid.
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